5:06 pm
August 27, 2016
5:16 am
August 27, 2016
5:40 am
August 4, 2010
5:40 am
December 17, 2016
6:10 am
August 4, 2010
If the alt/subprime mortgage sector systemically can't fund itself via retail deposits, and no well-funded alternative steps up to acquire those books, there's going to be a big bunch of current homeowners who won't be able to find someone to renew their mortgages as they come due. I think Home probably has 40-50000 residential non-insured mortgages (?), and presumably Equitable something similar. That's going to be a big enough problem to make it a political issue.
6:19 am
December 17, 2016
6:29 am
August 4, 2010
People keep confusing liquidity and solvency. Home might have liquidity problems eventually if they can't keep their GIC base, since much of their balance sheet would be tied up in mortgages. But they'd only have insolvency problems if those mortgages are worth much less than their book value - then CDIC would have to finance a Home bankruptcy or underwater sale. There isn't much evidence of that, but whether it would be easy to find a deep-pocketed acquirer for Home willing to take on that business if that became necessary is an interesting question.
I don't know what sort of "sector selloff" might cause problems for CDIC/CMHC. The retail-funded subprime sector (Home, Equitable, ???) is a small and specialized portion of the market. You aren't going to get a run on the larger banks!
6:40 am
December 17, 2016
I don't disagree with you BUT sometimes these "things" have a way of crossing over and cascading. Last time I saw a figure for trust and mortgage loan companies it was like 3% of the mortgage market ... banks are at 75%.
What perked my attention, if media reports are to be believed, was that questionable bridge financing deal that HCG is now involved in.
I think this is an important point made by NorthernRaven
"If ... no well-funded alternative steps up to acquire those books, there's going to be a big bunch of current homeowners who won't be able to find someone to renew their mortgages as they come due."
10:34 am
December 12, 2009
I agree with NorthernRaven and others. With all due respect, "Top It Up," you're feeding this mass hysteria and I'd kindly ask that you refrain from such activities. 🙂
Also, to clarify either a misunderstanding or false statement in one of your posts that you could be sitting on "CDIC (cash) payouts in your RRSP account," that would only happen if CDIC's deposit insurance regime had to be tapped and they couldn't find another CDIC member institution to takeover those customer's HISA and GIC deposits. Even if the "assuming FI" felt that some of the GIC rates were too high, they'd likely still honour them even if it meant marginally reduced profitability until they matured. I can't envision, frankly, a scenario where CDIC has to tap its deposit insurance funds to cover deposits. CDIC also has the ability, since 2008, to "step in" and basically run the bank and even own the bank, to set it up for a takeover by another bank. My point is...tapping deposit insurance funds is a last resort. 🙂
NorthernRaven's point about solvency and liquidity differences is a key one, the former being more problematic but, even then, may not cause CDIC deposit insurance to be tapped as most of Home Trust's mortgages are CMHC-, Genworth- or Canada Guaranty-insured, the first of which being fully government guaranteed (there's talk of mortgage lenders having to pay a 'deductible' in the case of mortgages that go bad but it hasn't come to pass yet) and even in the latter two's case, their mortgage insurance is 90% guaranteed by the federal government, meaning Genworth and Canada Guaranty are only on the hook for the first 10% of the mortgage. 😉
HCG has secured this line of credit to bolster its capital structure and likely satisfy regulators. As long as they can prevent mass GIC deposits from withdrawing at maturity, which could be done, in part, with higher rates, they'll be fine and this line of credit acts as a short-term "cushion" in that respect. On profitability, however, the next few quarters are going to be "messy," to put it lightly, and that may even effect things like dividends for shareholders.
In all of this mass hysteria created by "short sellers" and the media, particularly, it is shareholders that are the hardest hit, as well as HCG in its ability to operate as an independent company, potentially. Depositors are well-protected, both in knowing their deposits (over and above their CDIC limit) will either be assumed by another Canadian FI or, in the worse case, CDIC's deposit insurance regime would be tapped up to applicable limits. 🙂
Cheers,
Doug
10:41 am
December 17, 2016
Doug said
With all due respect, "Top It Up," you're feeding this mass hysteria and I'd kindly ask that you refrain from such activities.
Hardly. I've stated right off the top on this issue - IF you're within the CDIC limits you have ZIP to worry about.
Just having a conversation which is hardly "feeding this mass hysteria". Your own comments are trailing the day - HCG is on the sale block - move forward to the next step.
By the way, I didn't see moderator next to your name.
10:54 am
August 4, 2010
Doug said
NorthernRaven's point about solvency and liquidity differences is a key one, the former being more problematic but, even then, may not cause CDIC deposit insurance to be tapped as most of Home Trust's mortgages are CMHC-, Genworth- or Canada Guaranty-insured, the first of which being fully government guaranteed (there's talk of mortgage lenders having to pay a 'deductible' in the case of mortgages that go bad but it hasn't come to pass yet) and even in the latter two's case, their mortgage insurance is 90% guaranteed by the federal government, meaning Genworth and Canada Guaranty are only on the hook for the first 10% of the mortgage. 😉
One clarification - from their 2015 annual report, Home had a $20 billion balance sheet, and ~60% of this was "Traditional single-family residential mortgages", and I think most of this is uninsured - average interest income is 5%, and would be their subprime bread and butter. They had over $ 1 billion of their "Accelerator" mortgages (guaranteed), and 2-3 billion in securitized stuff they still have some interest in (obviously guaranteed), and some commercial/multifamily stuff and some credit card. I think a lot of their guaranteed stuff goes off-balance sheet into fully-offloaded securitized "under management" - they probably service this, and I think are responsible to maintain payments for delinquents to the mortgage bonds until insurance kicks in.
It would be interesting to know how much book-value of mortgages they had to pledge to HOOPP for that expensive credit facility, and whether HOOPP somehow got to pick and choose.
10:59 am
December 17, 2016
WOW ... this is a pretty curious arrangement
"HOOPP President and Chief Executive Officer Jim Keohane sits on Home Capital’s board and is a shareholder of the mortgage lender."
11:03 am
December 12, 2009
NorthernRaven said
Doug said
NorthernRaven's point about solvency and liquidity differences is a key one, the former being more problematic but, even then, may not cause CDIC deposit insurance to be tapped as most of Home Trust's mortgages are CMHC-, Genworth- or Canada Guaranty-insured, the first of which being fully government guaranteed (there's talk of mortgage lenders having to pay a 'deductible' in the case of mortgages that go bad but it hasn't come to pass yet) and even in the latter two's case, their mortgage insurance is 90% guaranteed by the federal government, meaning Genworth and Canada Guaranty are only on the hook for the first 10% of the mortgage. 😉
One clarification - from their 2015 annual report, Home had a $20 billion balance sheet, and ~60% of this was "Traditional single-family residential mortgages", and I think most of this is uninsured - average interest income is 5%, and would be their subprime bread and butter. They had over $ 1 billion of their "Accelerator" mortgages (guaranteed), and 2-3 billion in securitized stuff they still have some interest in (obviously guaranteed), and some commercial/multifamily stuff and some credit card. I think a lot of their guaranteed stuff goes off-balance sheet into fully-offloaded securitized "under management" - they probably service this, and I think are responsible to maintain payments for delinquents to the mortgage bonds until insurance kicks in.
It would be interesting to know how much book-value of mortgages they had to pledge to HOOPP for that expensive credit facility, and whether HOOPP somehow got to pick and choose.
Are you talking EQ Bank or Home Trust/Home Bank, NorthernRaven? I didn't think the institutional investor had been revealed. I suspected it was either an existing Canadian bank or maybe a pension plan but didn't think it'd been revealed, in the case of Home Trust/Home Bank. 🙂
Also, if EQ Bank you're talking about, yeah, 60% uninsured portfolio is probably reasonable with 40% government-insured. I'm not exactly sure how all that securitization off-balance sheet crap comes into play. You're probably right about them being responsible for the first few months of payments on a mortgage under foreclosure. Even if their portfolio has been securitized under a NHA Act mortgage bond program, wouldn't that mean EQ Bank had to buy bulk portfolio insurance from CMHC (or equivalent insurer) to qualify for its inclusion?
At any rate, we're kind of "getting into the weeds" a bit on stuff either of has only a cursory understanding, at best, so I think we should just leave it so as not to continue this hysterical discussion. 🙂
Cheers,
Doug
11:08 am
December 12, 2009
Top It Up said
This is a pretty curious arrangement"HOOPP President and Chief Executive Officer Jim Keohane sits on Home Capital’s board and is a shareholder of the mortgage lender."
I knew the mysterious "institutional investor" would have to be disclosed eventually, given the size of the line of credit. However, since HOOPP is apparently the lender and if its CEO sits on HCG's board, this would likely qualify as a "related party transaction" and would require swift disclosure (within a week or two) under securities laws.
I don't find it particularly curious but this does actually give me confidence in HCG's ability to continue as an independent publicly-traded company, at least in the medium-term. A takeover is still a likely possibility but I would think the Board would be foolish to entertain particularly "low ball" bids. This shows both he, and HOOPP, has confidence in HCG's overall mortgage underwriting and business strategy.
Cheers,
Doug
11:10 am
August 4, 2010
Yeah, Bloomberg has identified HOOPP as the unnamed angel/loanshark for Home. There's apparently some cross-director linkage between the two.
11:27 am
December 12, 2009
NorthernRaven said
Yeah, Bloomberg has identified HOOPP as the unnamed angel/loanshark for Home. There's apparently some cross-director linkage between the two.
LOL at your terming them a "loan shark". 😉
Cheers,
Doug
1:19 pm
August 4, 2010
Apparently HOOPP is getting $2 in mortgage collateral for every $1 advanced to Home, so their "risk" is pretty slight, and they probably won't even need to break any legs. With that and 70% LTV, HOOPP's CEO Jim Keohane estimated the underlying housing prices would have to drop 65% before they'd start losing anything!
And apparently they are (or were) part of a syndicate ("Syndicate"?) to make this loan - if they all are caught running out of a house in Apalachin, New York... 🙂
6:24 am
August 27, 2016
After browsing this thread I decided to put all my 500k cash into Oaken and EQ because highinterestsavings.ca absolutely attracts the smartest capital managers in the world. All those depositors drawing billions of cash are just idiots.
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